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I. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL VALUES
In the evolving context of governmental planning or efforts to
initiate governmental planning of transportation systems, considerations
of environmental noise have made very recent entry into the process. We
have generally been concerned with the primary, direct, and immediate
objectives of providing more or new transportation services than with
adverse side-effects such as congestion, air pollution, noise intrusion,
and aesthetic debasement.
Planning of a "complete" national transportation network was carried
out in our early history. This scheme, though never enacted, was put
forward in 1824 by the Corps of Topographical Engineers under the War
Department. Professor A. Hunter Dupree states in Science in the Federal
Government:
Despite constitutional scruples, the Congress
increasingly appropriated money for roads and
harbor improvements. One offshoot of Monroe's
straddling position on the constitutionality
of internal improvements was the Survey Act of
1824, under which the Corps of Topographical
Engineers made a comprehensive plan for canals
between the Chesapeake and the Ohio, along the
Atlantic seaboard, and for a road from Washing-
ton to New Orleans. This plan, the only one the
government ever attempted to make for the country
as a whole, required considerable technical
competence, and had it been executed would have
required even more.1
1
A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government 36 (1957).
In his first annual message to Congress of December 6, 1825,
President John Quincy Adams referred to the "internal improvement of the
country" in the very first sentence and then continued:
The great object of the institution of civil government
is the improvement of the condition of those who are
parties to the social compact, and no government, in
whatever form constituted, can accomplish the lawful
ends of its institution but in proportion as it improves
the condition of those over whom it is established.
Roads and canals, by multiplying and facilitating the
communications and intercourse between distant regions
and multitudes of men, are among the most important
means of improvement. 2
Professor Richard B. Morris in Great Presidential Decisions states in
reference to President Adams' proposal that:
(T)he measures of his administration were "just and
wise and every honest man should have supported
them," but many did not because they simply could
not abide their author, and still others because
they were frightened by his centralizing philosophy
of government. 3
Apart from President Adams' personality difficulties there were
substantial political, economic, demographic, and technological reasons
why a national road system was not considered an urgent matter. As
Samuel Eliot Morison states:
Watchers from afar can discern the shadow of things
to come in 1826, midway in President Adams' term of
office. The Erie Canal, completed the previous year,
made New York the Empire State and New York City the
world's most populous urban center. Yet the doom of
the canal as a principal means of heavy transportation
was sounded in 1826 by a little horse-drawn line, first
2Richard B. Morris, Great Presidential Decisions 109 (1960).
3 1Id. at 107.
3railroad in the United States, built near the home
of the Adamses in Quincy; and shortly the Baltimore
& Ohio steam railway would be chartered. 4
And to move further along in the last century:
Canals still carried most of the freight in 1850,
but the completion of the Hudson River Railroad
from New York to Albany, where it connected with
the New York Central for Buffalo, and of the
Pennsylvania Railroad from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh,
caused such an astounding transfer of freight from
canals to railroads, particularly in the winter season,
as to prove the superiority of rail for long-distance
hauls, and to suggest that the locomotive was the
proper instrument for penetrating the continent.
5
Surely 1800 to 1900 was the century of coal and steam. The railroad
was the means of transportation in that it fitted both the conditions and
needs of this rapidly expanding nation even though canals continued in
operation and steamboats found their use on the Mississippi and its tribu-
taries. A new transportation era began to emerge about 1900, however.
Professor Morison's lively tract on "The Auto and the Ad Man" provides
the flavor as well as some interesting facts on this transitional period.
6
During the last century the Federal government not only tended to en-
courage technological development, including transportation, as by means of
land grants to the railroads but, in some cases, the Federal government be-
came directly involved. Support was lent to the "demonstration phase" of the
development of the telegraph. 7 Support was also lent to certain research
efforts. For example, between 1816 and 1848 "a total of 233 steamboat
4Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People
420 (1965).
5 1d. at 478.
6Id. at 888-893.
7A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government 48 (1957).
explosions had occurred in which 2,563 persons had been killed and 2,097
injured, with property losses in excess of $3 million." While it was not
until 1852 that stringent and effective laws were enacted regulating
boiler construction, operation and inspection, the Franklin Institute
had researched the problem in 1836 and made recommendations at that time
which embodied most of the recommendations finally adopted in Federal
legislation of 1852.8
In general, we have followed the presumption of most Western nations,
namely, that the impact of scientific inquiry and technological advance is
socially beneficial. From Francis Bacon on we seem to have accepted the
"science is good in itself" notion. Certainly the scientific approach,
however superficial, pervaded the outlook of the philosophers of the
Enlightenment, that high point of belief in human rationality and the po-
tential of man to perfect himself and society on earth. The Royal Society
(chartered 1662) and similar organizations promoted the idea that "investment
in science was an investment in prosperity." 9 Such organizations as the
Lunar Society (1775-1791) were more "practical minded" and socially sensi-
tive to the impact of science and technology than the more prestigious
Royal Society.10 Even the human wastage and misery inflicted by the early
19th century Industrial Revolution did not greatly diminish our infatuation
with science and technology.
8John G. Burke, "Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power," Technology
and Culture, Winter 1966, Vol. VII, at 13-23.
9A. Rupert Hall, "Culture, Intellectual and Social Foundations, 1600-
1750," in Technology in Western Civilization, 114 (1967).
10Id. at 114-115.
5However, protests were made over the abuses of expanding industrialism
supported by technological development. Consider the following quote from
Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and Modern Times in reference to Thomas
Huxley:
He came to Baltimore toward the end of the last century
to say that he remained unimpressed by all the power,
natural resources, knowledge and machinery that had so
greatly extended man's competence over his physical
environment. "The great issue," he went on, "about
which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of over-
hanging fate is, what are you going to do with all
these things?"ll
Yet the prevailing attitude continued to encourage technological development.
This was particularly true in America during the 19th century where resources
were abundant, the population was dispersed, transportation needs were criti-
cal and individual initiative was given the widest scope.
The industrialism supported by coal, steam and a burst of inventiveness,
motivated by the excitement of "progress" and personal gain, reflected a
social attitude raised to a Constitutional right through the doctrine of
"freedom of contract." 1 2 Furthermore, numerous dedicated efforts to protect
a broader and longer term concept of the "public interest" were blunted or
defeated by the reluctance of the Federal government to encroach upon
the traditional bounds of State "police power" over health, safety and
general well-being.13
1 1Morison, Men, Machines and Modern Times 208 (1966).
1 2Louis H. Mayo, "The Management of Technology Assessment," in Technology
Assessment: The Proceedings of a Seminar Series, (Raphael G. Kasper,
ed.). (The George Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in
Science and Technology) July, 1969 at 89, specifically f.n. 22, at 99.
Ibid., sDecificallv f.n. 23. In this connection it is-of interest to
consider the following quotation from Richard W. Barsness, "The
We have relied primarily on the "market" system for guiding and shaping
the nature of new technological applications. There have been notable
exceptions, however, as with the long agitation for improved public pro-
tection from adulterated foods and drugs which eventually resulted in the
first Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. But governmental regulation has, in
general, been gradual and piecemeal and - as in the case of transportation -
has usually evolved as a reaction to public demand for correction of speci-
fic and severe adverse effects of particular applications. The establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is an example.
As is well known, many of our more prominent technology-based regu-
latory agencies and statutory measures to control technological applications
were not established until well into the 20th century. For the most part,
these agencies represent reactive measures rather than prospective efforts
to assure development of a new technology in the public interest. Even
broadcasting was not brought under regulatory control until 1927 after
frequency interference became intolerable. The development of nuclear
energy represents perhaps the most outstanding example of a new technology
Department of Transportation: Concept and Structure," Western Political
Quarterly (September 1970) at 500.
Although the first congressional proposal to create a unified
federal transportation agency occurred as early as 1874, and
recommendations of this nature became particularly frequent
from the 1930's on, Congress did not adopt cabinet-level
Department of Transportation (DOT) until October 1966. The
key word and theme in the official declaration of policy for
the agency was coordination. President Lyndon B. Johnson
cogently summarized the ultimate objective as being "a co-
ordinated transportation system that permits travelers and
goods to move conveniently and efficiently from one means
of transportation to another, using the best characteristics
of each."
7whose development began under government supervision and for which a
reasonably well-ordered assessment structure has been maintained.1 4
Increasingly, since World War II, technological developments have
been initiated and supported by the government or through combined govern-
ment and industry efforts or government-university arrangements.
The strong emphasis on promotion of the direct and immediate benefits
of advancing technology through the 19th and the first half of the 20th
century does not mean, of course, that all segments of the affected public
were in sympathy with this underlying social philosophy and most certainly
not with some of its effects. In the mid-1800's many English citizens pro-
tested vigorously over the noisy, smoky locomotives. Some landowners
arranged for the intermittent firing of guns across their grounds to keep
out railroad surveyors. "Parliament, exercising the right of eminent domain,
eventually overcame these difficulties for the railroad companies, but only
at a price: as a concession to objectors, a change was included in railway
charters requiring that locomotives must not emit smoke."l1 5 Public reaction
to large steam carriages "brought forth in 1865 the famous Red Flag Act
which required a flagman on foot to precede each steam vehicle."l1 6 On the
other hand, new technologies were sometimes applauded as the means by which
more agreeable qualities might be introduced into the social environment.
1 4See Mayo, "The New Technology and National Goals: Some Implications
for Legal-Policy Decision-making," 37 Notre Dame Lawyer 33, 42 (1961).
Eugene S. Ferguson, "Steam Transportation," in Technology in Western
Civilization 301 (1967).
1 6Ibid.
8A quotation from Scientific American for July 1899 states:
The improvement in city conditions by the general
adoption of the motor car can hardly be overestimated.
Streets clean, dustless, and odorless, with light
rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly and noiselessly
over their smooth expanse, would eliminate a greater
part of the nervouseness, distraction and strain of
modern metropolitan life. 1 7
1 7Quoted in Reason Awake: Science for Man by Rene Dubos
(1970) at 95.
9II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POWER WITH RESPECT TO TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS PLANNING
Only in recent years has environmental noise gained sufficient atten-
tion as a social problem to generate assessments of the situation, proposals
for comprehensive public programs of noise abatement, and enactment of a few
innovative regulatory schemes. Various factors have forced the problem to
the focus of public attention, as for example, the introduction of commer-
cial jet-powered aircraft over the past 15 years and increasing vehicular
traffic resulting from urbanization and further stimulated by the Interstate
Highway System. The decibel level in various noise environments is definitely
increasing. But there is more involved than this simple explanation of the
growing concern with noise. This can be described as a rather drastic shift
in social value priorities. This general concern, of which noise intrusion
is but one element, is reflected in various statutory schemes enacted over
the past several years of which the most prominent is the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 which requires pursuant to 1102(2)(C), the sub-
mission of environmental impact statements on "major Federal actions" and
which established the Council on Environmental Quality.1 8
The NEPA of 1969 and various other legislative schemes promoting en-
vironmental quality are indicative of the need for anticipatory project
assessments, and hence, for more thoughtful planning of public and public/
private programs in such fields as energy generation, law enforcement, health
care services, and transportation. It is with respect to the initiation of
various new transportation systems that public concern with the full scope
of environmental values and amenities has, perhaps, been most manifest.
1 8National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. S 4321 et seq.
NEPA became effective as of January 1i, 1970.
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Public protests have stalled the implementation of new airports or the
modification of existing airport facilities.1 9 Numerous lawsuits have
been instigated over the past few years which have had the effect of
blocking new highway construction. 20
There is little question but that government entities at all levels
have been somewhat tardy, if not delinquent, in giving adequate emphasis
to the transportation systems planning process. The "planning function"
for present purposes will be discussed in terms of the provision for and
implementation of anticipatory assessments designed to take into account
the effects of proposed transportation innovations on all participants and
social value-institutional processes affected by given proposals. Partic-
ular attention will be focused on the extent to which environmental noise
is given consideration as an adverse consequence in such assessments.
The abatement of environmental noise presents a severe challenge to
legal-political improvisation as well as to technological ingenuity. The
problem context of environmental noise is a complex one in that noise is
not associated with one - or a few - social functions but is emitted from
a vast variety of completely unrelated sources. Many of the most obnoxious
1 9See New York Times, Oct. 22, 1972, p. 30, col. 1, "New Jetport, a
Rarity Today, Ready in Missouri" which states in part:
The growing resistance to new jetports around the
country by environmentalists and citizens' groups--
and the ability of such groups to delay or block
such projects in court--has led many aviation leaders
to forecast that few new airports like the Kansas City
facility will ever be built. The nation's last major
new jetport opened in 1969 in Houston; no others have
been started since then.
2 0 See, for example, Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe,
458 F.2d 1323 (1972) and cases cited therein.
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noises come from moving sources or from multiple and diverse activities
acting in concert. Hence, various techniques (abatement at the source,
reduction of effects, or compensation for noise harm) have been devised
in an attempt to cope with the multiplicity of sources and affected per-
sons or activities. The noise abatement task is further complicated by
the necessity to determine at what level of government these various tech-
niques can best be prescribed and implemented.2 1
It is sometimes said that noise is a "local problem," but this
characterization can be a bit misleading. No doubt, noise is a "local
problem" with respect to the Effects of noise. It is not necessarily a
local problem with respect to the Control over the abatement of noise at
the source or over the reduction of the magnitude of noise effects. The
"noise context" selected for control purposes will ordinarily be defined
in terms of the noise effects emitted from particular discrete noise
sources or identifiable noise environments.
21The range and variety of possible environmental noise abatement and
control configurations are suggested by an Illustrative Regulatory
Matrix prepared by the Program of Policy Studies in Science and
Technology of The George Washington University. Dimensions considered
include:
Baseline Data
* Noise Sources and Noise Environments
* Noise Effects
* Social Impact Evaluation of Effects - Techniques
Regulatory Configuration Elements
Objectives and Functions
Formal Authority and Levels of Control
Modes of Control and Implementation Techniques
Criteria: Units of Measurement
* Standards
Enforcement: Remedies and Penalties
Affected Participants
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What then is the basic legal-political framework within which the
environmental noise problem must be analyzed? Environmental noise is
primarily the result of a highly industrialized society. In a most
thoughtful book of a few years back entitled Industrialism and Industrial
Man, the authors state:
Pluralistic industrialism will never reach a final
equilibrium. The contest between the forces of
uniformity and for diversity will give it life and
movement and change.
The themes of uniformity and diversity, and manager
and managed which mark the world today will charac-
terize it in the future as well. There will be con-
stant adjustments between these eternally conflicting
themes, but no permanent settlement. They will con-
stitute the everlasting threads of history: the
uniformity that draws on technology and the diversity
that draws on individuality; the authority that stems
from the managers and the rebellions, however muted,
that stem from the managed.2 2
Our Constitutional development seems consistent with this formulation. For
example, Art.I,§8(3) provides that the Congress shall have power "To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." The 1824 Supreme Court case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton 1;
6 L.Ed. 23) gave impetus to the promotion of the "Commerce Clause" and inter-
state commerce by holding a New York law providing for a State "steamboat
monopoly" invalid. The subsequent 1851 case of Cooley v. The Board of Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia (53 U.S. [12 How.] 299) has had great significance
in terms of mediating between the themes of uniformity and diversity noted
above. In that case the Supreme Court undertook to determine whether the
22Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison & Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man
296 (1960).
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power of the Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce was ex-
clusive or whether it might be in part shared by the states. The Court
adopted a rule which placed a segment of control in the states, the test
being whether a particular subject or activity of commerce requires uniform
national control or whether it is sufficiently local (and unique) in charac-
ter to permit State regulation. For example, a strong national interest has
been asserted in railway regulation. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
(325 U.S. 761 [1945]) the Supreme Court, relying on the Cooley Doctrine
held that the Arizona Train Limit Law (limiting train length) contravened
the Commerce Clause, the majority opinion stating that "Here examination of
all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is outweighed
by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical, efficient railway
transportation service, which must prevail." But a strong State/local in-
terest has been recognized in the regulation of the use of interstate as well
as State highways. In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.
(303 U.S. 177 [1938]), a State statute limiting the width and weight of motor
trucks which was more restrictive than those of most other states was held
not to be an undue burden on interstate commerce even though "interstate
carriage by motor trucks has become a national industry," the Court stating:
"Few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of local concern as is
the use of state highways." But compare Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.
(359 U.S. 520 [1959]), wherein the Supreme Court found an Illinois contour
mudguard requirement for motor freight carriers to be in conflict with the
Commerce Clause even though such "local safety measures" are normally not
found to place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
14
The "states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of
interstate commerce,...concurrently with the Federal government" and
"Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest is valid unless preempted by Federal action,...or unduly burden-
some on...interstate commerce...."23 In general, preemption by Federal
legislation is not to be inferred "unless the act of Congress, fairly
interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state."2 4
2 3Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit 362 U.S. 440, 441-443 (1960).
24Ibid.
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III. CONSIDERATION BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES OF THE NOISE FACTOR IN THE
ASSESSMENT OF HIGHWAY PROJECTS AND VEHICULAR OPERATIONS
Consideration of the noise factor by governmental entities in the
planning of highway transportation systems has, until very recently, been
notorious for its absence.25 Planning in terms of anticipatory total social
Impact assessments has not arrived even yet, although there are now strong
tendencies in this direction.26
2 5The lateness of requirement of noise assessment of highway project
planning is clearly indicated by the case of Concerned 
Citizens of
Marlboro v. Volpe, 459 F. 2d 332 (1972), wherein the court stated
after reciting S109(a) of Title 23, Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C.
S 101-136:
Plaintiff's contention is that the reference in this
provision to "safety" mandated that the Secretary not
approve Route 18 construction without consideration of
the extent to which noise and air pollution would in-
crease as a result of the project. At the time S 109
was enacted, however, air and noise pollution were not
considerations within its intended scope. To interpret
the section as plaintiffs suggest would be unreasonable,
especially when it is recognized that Congress amended
S 109 in 1970 specifically to add "air, noise and water
pollution" as factors to be studied before federal ap-
proval could be given to projects thereafter proposed.
See P.L. 91-605 (Dec. 31, 1970), 23 U.S.C. S 109 (h).
Id. at 334.
2 6Most planning and research efforts are still somewhat narrowly focused.
The RECAT study of the Ad Hoc Committee on Regulatory Effects on the
Costs of Automotive Transportation of the Office of Science and Tech-
nology (April 1972) identified the priority problem as one of quieting
trucks which are the noisiest vehicles on the highways. See Noise
Control Report, April 17, 1972, p. 5. The July 10, 1972 Noise Control
Report states that DOT awarded three contracts totaling over $1 million
for research aimed at reducing engine noise from diesel trucks. Id. at 55.
It is ironic that efforts toward more comprehensive assessment and plan-
ning of highway/vehicular configurations have not occurred until the
Interstate Highway System has been over 75% completed. The Washington
Daily News of February 5, 1972, p. 11, col. 4, reported:
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Such planning is to be clearly distinguished from the reactive type
of ad hoc regulations which have been in existence for some time relating
to various types of traffic noise control. 27 Many municipalities have for
years required mufflers on motor vehicles and some have restricted horn
noise. Most states have long provided statutory requirements for mufflers
and several have restrictions on horn noise. Traditionally, local ordinances
have provided for subjective standards such as restricting the making of
"loud," "unusual," or "unnecessary" noise rather than by establishing
quantitative (decibel limit) standards. To some extent, zoning ordinances
providing for "quiet zones" have reflected slightly more concern for the
long-term welfare of the community.
This situation is beginning to change. Relatively new environmental
noise codes in Chicago 28 and New York City 29 clearly represent a dramatic
Latest cost estimate of the 42,500-mile Interstate Highway
System: $76.3 billion up $6.4 billion from 1970 estimate.
Transportation Department says 76 percent of system is open
to traffic, another 20 percent in construction or engineering
phase. Environmental rows over urban and suburban links will
delay completion of system until 1980.
NOTE: When system was authorized in mid-1950s, completion
was targeted for this year and cost was pegged at $45 billion.
27See EPA Report Laws and Regulatory Schemes for Noise Abatement,
December 31, 1971, at Sections 1.2.2 and 1.4.2 (a Report prepared by the
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology of The George Washington
University under EPA Contract 68-04-0032 for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency/Office of Noise Abatement and Control) hereinafter
cited as EPA Report.
28 See discussion of the first eight month's experience on the Chicago
ordinance in Noise Control Report, August 7, 1972, p. 77.
29See discussions relating to the New York City Code in Noise Control
Report, July 10, 1972, at p. 54 and also pages 124 and 139.
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step forward in comprehensive planning for environmental noise control in
metropolitan areas.
At the State level, California has developed a statutory scheme to
assure the reduction of highway traffic noise over a period of time. The
California Vehicle Code by §23130 prescribes "operational" Vehicle Noise
Limits for speed limit of 35 mph or less and for speed limit of more than
35 mph. Section 23130(C) provides that "This section applies to the total
noise from a vehicle or combination of vehicles and shall not be construed
as limiting or precluding the enforcement of any other provisions of this
code relating to motor vehicle exhaust noise." (emphasis supplied).
Section 27160 of the Vehicle Code provides that "(a) No person shall sell
or offer for sale a new motor vehicle which provides a maximum noise exceeding
the following noise limit..." (with dates and decibel limits prescribed).
Colorado and Minnesota have recently enacted legislation which is patterned
closely after the California scheme.30
The history of the Federal-aid to Highway programs perhaps offers the
most useful insights into the environmental noise problem with respect to
highway motor vehicle transportation. This program has been primarily con-
cerned with the basic objective of moving masses of people and goods rather
than with secondary or derivative environmental amenities.
30See EPA Report, supra note 27, at 1-76 and 1-79.
See also Noise Control Report, May 1, 1972, p. 13 re an amendment
to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code relating to noise levels.
See also The New Jersey Noise Control Act of 1971 (1/24/72) which
relates to the control and abatement of noise, empowering the State
Department of Environmental Protection to promulgate codes, rules and
regulations for such purposes and creates a Noise Control Council.
Assembly, No. 2181, introduced February 16, 1971.
18
The Federal-aid Highway legislation of 1916 laid the foundation for a
cooperative Federal-State relationship and resulted in the strengthening of
State highway departments. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 "led to the
rapid development of an integrated network of improved highways throughout
the entire country." Also, "In 1921 the War Department made a comprehensive
study of the highway routes important to the national defense," a study
which was brought up to date in 1935 through the cooperative efforts of the
War Department, the Bureau of Public Roads, and the American Association of
State Highway Officials. In 1941 the President appointed a National Inter-
regional Highway Committee to investigate the need for a limited system of
national highways and to advise the Federal Works Administrator as to the
prospects for utilizing some of the manpower and industrial capacity ex-
pected to be available at the end of World War II. The Federal-aid Highway
Act of 1944 directed the designation of a National System of Interstate
Highways limited in extent to 40,000 miles "so located as to connect by
routes as directed as practicable the principal metropolitan areas, cities
and industrial centers, to serve the national defense and to connect at
suitable border points with routes of continental importance in the Dominion
of Canada and the Republic of Mexico." This rationale further stressed:
The long distances of the transcontinental routes are
a by-product of the selection of the most important local
and regional highways which articulate into continuous
routes. This concept of the system is based upon continuing
traffic surveys and flow analyses which show a heavy pre-
dominance of motor vehicles making relatively short trips
and a small proportion of actually transcontinental high-
way traffic.31
31
See on the subject ot the evaluation of the Interstate Highway System:
Ester J. Dudgeon, "National Interstate and Defense Highway System"
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One of the more interesting episodes in the National highway system
development concerns the persistent efforts of the late Congressman J. Buell
Snyder of Pennsylvania. Commencing with a bill in 1936 directing the Bureau
of Public Roads to survey and locate a system of transcontinental and north-
south highways, Representative Snyder moved in 1937 to a proposal for a system
of "superhighways" 200 feet wide with six traffic lanes, brightly lighted,
with no obstructions, so that they could be used as emergency landing strips
for airplanes and further suggested that airports be built at or near the
intersections of such highways. 3 2
Perhaps most relevant to our present purpose of evaluating the Federal
level highway planning process in terms of a total social impact assessment
is a review of the Report of the Presidential Advisory Committee on "A Ten
Year National Highway Program," attached to the Message of the President,
National Highway Program, of February 22, 1955, which was referred to the
Committee on Public Works, 84th Congress, ist Session, House Document 93.
In 1956 the Congress enacted major Federal highway aid legislation which was
responsive to the request of President Eisenhower for:
(A) grand plan for a properly articulated (highway)
system that solves the problems of speedy, safe,
transcontinental travel--inter-city transportation--
access highways--and farm-to-market movement--metro-
politan area congestion--bottlenecks--and parking.
While the President's Message directed attention to the "Nation's highway
at 2 (1958). (Analyst in Transportation and Communications, Economics
Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.)
See also, Mayo "The National Highway Program and Motor Freight Carrier
Development: A Technology Assessment Perspective," (The George Washington
University: Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology)
March 22, 1969.
32
See Dudgeon supra note 31, at 5.
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system, other modes of transportation being excluded," 3 3 the social sub-system
posited for this anticipatory assessment by both the Advisory Committee study
and the House Committee on Public Works clearly disclosed an intention to in-
clude significant social interactions and implications of the proposed "National
highway system." Further,
The Congressional Committee Report shows that an
extremely wide range of engineering, financial, and
social factors was considered. From our present
perspective, however, we would note that some factors
were given no attention whatever. The Advisory Committee
and the Congress seemed to be much more concerned with the
efficient implementation of the highway program rather
than with cumulative and qualitative social impacts, par-
ticularly those which might be detrimental. No consider-
ation was given to increasing environmental pollution
which would result from the growing traffic volume: air
pollution from exhausts, engine noise, resulting aesthetic
debasement, or the derivative health hazards from the fore-
going sources. Nor was a great deal of attention given to
the relationship between the increased number and size of
motor freight carriers and the possible3 ncreased hazards
to private auto drivers and passengers.
Taking the Executive-Legislative anticipatory assessment of the Inter-
state Highway System as the planning reference base for this discussion, let's
move ahead 12 years to 1968 when Senate bill S. 2658 was introduced during the
90th Congress which proposed increased maximum size and weight limits for
motor freight carriers. -It might have been expected that a relatively compre-
hensive assessment would have been made of the anticipated effects of this
33Presidential Advisory Committee Report, "A Ten Year National Highway
Program," at 3, attached to the Message of the President, National
Highway Program, of February 22, 1955. Referred to the Committee on
Public Works, 84th Congress, ist Session, House Document No. 93.
34
Mayo, "The Relationship of Technology Assessment to Environmental
Management," (The George Washington University: Program of Policy
Studies in Science and Technology) SDP 206, October, 1969, at 21-22.
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legislation. Senate Report No. 1026, Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate
of March 27, 1968, Vehicular Weights and Dimensions, to accompany S. 2658,
stated that:
Among the major issues presented to the committee were
those dealing with highway safety, economic impact,
effects of increases on road systems and structures and
the contributions of the various user beneficiaries.
Actually the Report gave very little attention to these factors other than to
the impact of increased weights and widths on the existing road systems and
structures. Some attention was given to highway safety and to increased
maintenance and construction costs, but the Senate Report, by no stretch
of the imagination, could be considered an adequate anticipatory total
social impact assessment. 3 5
This conclusion was to some extent recognized and, apparently, even
rationally justified as being consistent with the policy enunciated in a
letter from the Secretary of Commerce of August 18, 1964, to the Speaker
of the House which made the point that such a proposal as that represented
in S. 2658 should be considered as only a phase of a continuing process of
"progressive implementation" of the Nation's highway system. Therefore,
it would seem not only fair but prudent to appraise the S. 2658 assessment
in the time-dimensional context of the evolving interstate highway system.
If one views the 1968 assessment in the context of the sequence of assess-
ments made by the Congress between 1956 and 1968, a somewhat different per-
spective can be adopted. Numerous assessments leading to legislation or
new regulations relating to air pollution, highway safety, highway beauti-
fication, citizen participation in freeway location, and reorganization
35Id. at 21-22.
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of the entire Federal transportation regulatory structure were conducted
during the 1956-1968 interim period.3 6 Also, pursuant to the Federal-aid
Highway Act of 1956, the Secretary of Commerce had undertaken to determine
36a) Federal Highways, Billboard Regulations P.L. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89
(1958). Further legislation, P.L. 86-342, 73 Stat. 611 (1959);
P.L. 87-61, 75 Stat. 122 (1961); P.L. 88-157, 77 Stat. 276 (1963).
b) Air Pollution from Motor Vehicle Exhaust Fumes, P.L. 86-493, 74
Stat. 162 (1960.
c) Clean Air Act, P.L. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
d) Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, P.L. 89-272, 79 Stat.
992 (1965).
e) Air quality Act, P.L. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
f) Interstate Compacts on Traffic Safety, P.L. 85-684 (1958).
g) Specification of Hydraulic Brake Fluids, P.L. 87-637, 76 Stat.
437 (1962).
h) Minimum Standards for Seat Belts, P.L. 88-201, 77 Stat. 361 (1963).
i) Provision for State Highway Safety Programs, P.L. 89-139, 79 Stat.
578 (1965).
j) National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, P.L. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718 (1966).
k) Highway Safety Act, P.L. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966).
1) Standards for Bridge Inspection, P.L. 90-495, 82 Stat. --- (1968).
m) Highway Beautification Act, P.L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (1965).
Additional legislation, P.L. 90-495, 82 Stat. --- (1968).
n) Establishment of the Department of Transportation, including the
National Transportation Safety Board, P.L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
o) Further action relevant to the National Highway Program includes
provision for broader community participation in highway planning.
DOT (Bureau of Public Roads) Policy and Procedure Memorandum of
January 14, 1969.
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future maximum desirable dimensions and weights for vehicles operating on
the Federal-aid highway systems and a report was made to the Congress on
August 18, 1964. 3 7
The pertinent question remains, however, namely, whether consideration
by the Congress of the various highway-related legislation during the 1956-
1968 time period was "programmed" in such manner as to achieve a close ap-
proximation to a total social impact assessment through time. S. 2658
breezed through the Senate but met strong opposition in the House and was
defeated, in large measure, it would appear, because many affected partici-
pants brought to the attention of the House members that several significant
"social costs" had not been given appropriate consideration by the Senate.
3 8
The author has concluded in a previous paper that:
It is clear that the interim 1956-1968 legislation had
the effect of filling in some of the gaps or completing
lightly treated segments of the 1956 assessment. It is
an interesting question, however, as to the extent to
which this was accomplished by deliberate design, by
simple response to insistent public or special interest
demands, through serendipity from other programs such
as air pollution control, or from sheer accident. Only
to the extent such legislative proposals were advanced
as deliberately designed components of an overall inte-
grated program of Highway/Motor Freight Carrier technology
would it satisfy the Total Impact Assessment Model. While
the aggregative assessments through time did tend to ex-
pand the scope of the social sub-system treated, they do
not appear to have been, in any real sense, programmed to
secure a Total Impact Assessment within a socially per-
missible time span. The DOT/Bureau of Public Roads policy
3 7House Document No. 354, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., Maximum Desirable
Dimensions and Weights of Vehicles Operated on the Federal-Aid
Systems, of August 19, 1964.
3 8Supra note 34, at 22.
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of "progressive implementation" does not seem to be at all
the equivalent of the Total Impact Assessment approach.3 9
It may be contended, of course, that in view of the Congressional
committee structure and the customary legislative approach of submitting
specific bills to take care of particular problems, it is unrealistic to
expect the Congress to conduct total social impact assessments of trans-
portation systems or other public programs either at a specific time or on
an aggregative basis through time. The fact remains, however, that the
Congress has tended to approach transportation system development for the
most part on an ad hoc, piecemeal, and non-integrative basis.
Daniel P. Moynihan has asserted that we are moving from a focus on
independent programs which "relate to a single part of the system" to policy
which "seeks to respond to the system in its entirety." 4 0 He expects this
movement to be a definitive trend in the 1970's. In short, we are giving
increasing attention to total social problem contexts or social systems as
contrasted with programs directed toward particular parts of such systems
which are not coordinated by an overall policy. "(A) policy approach to
government . . . (seeks) to encompass the largest possible range of phenomena
and concerns."4 1 Moynihan cites the 1956 Interstate and Defense Highway
System as the "largest public works program in history" and states that the
eventual judgment will be that it has "had more influence on the shape and
3 9 Id. at 23-24.
4 0Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Concept of Public Policy in the 1970's,"
Speech given at Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, April 6, 1970, at 5.
4 1Id. at 11.
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development of American cities, the distribution of population within
metropolitan areas, and across the nation as a whole, the location of
industry and various kinds of employment opportunities (and in all of
these, immense influence on race relations and the welfare of black
Americans) than any initiative of the middle third of the 20th Century."4 2
But he also concludes that "the politics of getting the Interstate Highway
Program enacted, decreed, or at least indicated, the narrowest possible
definition of its purposes and impact. 4 3
Moynihan comments with reference to the planning and implementation
of the Interstate Highway System by the Bureau of Public Roads:
As bureaucrats, their instinct was faultless. Had
anyone realized what they were in fact doing, the
sheer magnitude of the interests they were affecting,
it is nigh impossible to imagine that they would have
won acceptance. Indeed, a bare fifteen years after the
Interstate program commenced, it is near impossible to
get a major highway program approved in most large
American cities. But it is too late: most systems
have been built. In the process--such at least would
be my views--quite appalling mistakes were made, but
they were mistakes having to do with issues nominally
altogether unrelated to the highway progra 4itself, and
so no one was responsible for them . . . .
Surely it is possible to hope for something more.
Government must seek out its hidden policies, raising
them to a level of consciousness and acceptance--or
rejection--and acknowledgement of the extraordinary
range of contradictions that are typically encountered. .
Surely also it is possible to hope for a career civil
4 21d. at 15. See also, Juan Cameron, "How the Interstate Changed the
Face of the Nation," Fortune, July 1971, p. 78.
4 3Moynihan, supra note 40, at 17.
4 4 1bid.
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service that is not only encouraged, but required to
see their activities in the largest possible scope.4 5
Whatever the anticipatory assessment deficiencies of the Congress, 4 6
it has, in recent years, enacted a number of regulatory schemes which obli-
gate the Department of Transportation to take into account a broader range
of social impacts than has been customary in the past. For example, §138
of the Federal-aid to Highways Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C.A. §1653(f)(Supp. 1971)
provides in part that "It is hereby declared to be the national policy that
special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the country-
side and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges,
and historic sites" and implements this policy with specified requirements
placed on the Secretary of Transportation. And the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 - @102(2)(C) requires environmental impact statements be
submitted on all "major Federal actions." 4 7 Numerous court cases are now
being initiated which attempt to secure strict compliance by the Secretary
4 5 Id. at 18.
4 6Hopefully, the enactment of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972,
Public Law 92-484, 92nd Cong., H.R. 10243, of October 13, 1972, re-
flects a more favorable attitude of the Congress toward the needs
for adequate anticipatory project assessments.
4 7Several states now have or are contemplating comprehensive environ-
mental quality legislation patterned to some extent along NEPA lines.
The California scheme, for example, requires environmental impact
statements similar to NEPA's. In this connection see Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, September 2, 1972,
Sac. 7924, Supreme Court of the State of California, which held that
the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (Pub. Resources Code,
SS 21000-21151) requires that a municipal body submit an environmental
impact report pursuant to S 21151 before it issues a conditional use
or building permit to a private developer.
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with the provisions of these acts.4 8 While there is some evidence that many
citizens are becoming resentful over the delays in public project completion
resulting from court actions and with the inevitable additional costs
incurred by such delays, the Courts continue with vigorous application
49
of NEPA.
4 8 See, for example, Named Individual Members of the San Antonio
Conservation Society v. The Texas Highway Department, et al.,
and the United States Department of Transportation, 446 F 2d
1013 (1971).
See also Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (1971) wherein the court
stated in part:
To have standing the plaintiffs need only show that
the challenged action has caused them injury in fact,
economic or otherwise, and that the interest asserted
is within the interest sought to be regulated by statute.
Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D.Pa. 1970). The plaintiffs have
met these tests. If the road project is executed the
plaintiffs will be subjected to increased noise pollu-
tion and dangerous traffic-pedestrian conflicts. The
plaintiffs asserted their interest under a Congress-
ional mandate requiring federal agencies to file an
environmental impact statement. Id. at 1367.
See also Noise Control Report, July 24, 1972, p. 64 re the preliminary
injunction stopping construction on the 17-mile Century Freeway, linking
Los Angeles and Norwalk, until additional hearings could be held on noise
and air pollution.
4 9See Science, 28 January, 1972, p. 394-395, "Environmental Action
Organizations Are Suffering from Money Shortages, Slump in Public
Commitment." However, strong support for the strict application
of NEPA is continuing in the courts. See, e.g., Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 93 S.Ct. 1 (1972). Some courts, in construing
the requirements of NEPA, have emphasized not only the legal obli-
gation but the utility of public hearings in the evaluation of en-
vironmental impacts. For example, in Arlington Coalition on Trans-
portation v. Volpe, 458 F. 2d 1323 (1972) the Court States that:
Study by experts is not the equivalent of a public
hearing, and continuing evaluation of the economic
28
Furthermore, certain legislation of recent years makes specific ref-
erence to the abatement of highway noise. Starting in 1956, the Secretary
of Commerce (duties transferred to the Secretary of Transportation since
1966) was required to "cooperate with the States . . . in the development
of long-range highway plans . . which are formulated with due considera-
tion to their probable effect on the future development of urban areas of
more than fifty thousand population." The first active consideration of
highway noise at the Federal level was Policy and Procedures Memorandum
20-8 of the Bureau of Public Roads, issued January 14, 1969. Environmental
effects, which must be considered by the State or local sponsor seeking
effects of Arlington 1-66 based only on such study is,
therefore, not consideration within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 1338.
In Environmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (1972), the
opinion states that even if a "major Federal action" such as a
highway project is "initiated"prior to January 1, 1970, when NEPA
became law, that if the planning phase of the project did not take
place until after January 1, 1970, the S 102(2)(C) statement is
still required. However, if the planning and "design approval"
preceded the passage of NEPA, an environmental impact statement
is required only if "practicable." The court identified four
major factors to determine practicability after the project has
passed the planning stage:
1. The participation of the local community in the planning
of the project. "In regard to highway projects, PPM 20-8
clearly acknowledges the importance of public hearings and
local participation in the decision-making process." Id. at
1334.
2. The extent to which the state department involved has
attempted to take environmental factors into account in
regard to a particular project.
3. The likely harm to the environment if the project is
constructed as planned.
4. The cost to the state of halting construction while it
compiles an environmental impact statement.
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Federal aid, are defined to include "noise, air, and water pollution."
Pursuant to a 1970 amendment to the Federal-aid Highway Act (PL. 91-605)
the Secretary of Transportation is directed "to assure that possible
adverse economic, social, and environmental effects have been considered
in developing . . . (any Federally aided highway) project . . ." Further,
he is to "develop and promulgate standards for highway noise levels com-
patible with different land uses after July 1, 1972.50
5 0See discussion of these points in EPA Report, supra note 27, at
§l.1.2(A). The regulations proposed by the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration pursuant to section 136 (h) of the Federal-aid Highway Act
appear in 37 Fed. Reg. 8398 (April 26, 1972). The proposed regulations
pursuant to section 136(i) appear in 37 Fed. Reg. 11730 (June 13, 1972).
The approach taken in the two proposals is quite different. The 136 (h)
regulations, to be issued pursuant to the requirement that "the Secretary
. .promulgate guidelines designed to assure that possible adverse eco-
nomic, social, and environmental effects relating to any proposed project
on any Federal-aid system have been fully considered in developing such
project," require that State officials produce a NEPA-like study as part
of their submissions for location or design approval. As stated in the
proposal,
The purpose of these guidelines is to build into State
highway procedures specific processes whereby social,
economic and environmental effects will be considered,
and to require, as part of the requirements of obtaining
either design or location approval from the Federal High-
way Administration, that adverse effects have been recog-
nized and considered in making the determination to go
forward with the project . . .This memorandum further
requires States . . . to prepare a discussion of adverse
social, economic, environmental and engineering effects.
The discussions must include a recognition of such adverse
effects, an analysis of reasonable and prudent measures to
eliminate or minimize such effects and the estimated cost
of alternate measures considered.
The proposed regulations pursuant to section 136(i) specify noise level
standards for new highways based on the land use in the vicinity of the
proposed highway. "The purpose of the proposed PPM is to provide noise
standards for use by State highway agencies and FHWA field offices in
the planning and design of Federal-aid highways, and to assure, to the
extent feasible, and in the best overall public interest, that adequate
measures are taken to prevent highway noise from exceeding levels
compatible with different land uses."
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Perhaps the most significant noise abatement action ever taken is the
Noise Control Act of 197251 which provides for the establishment of Federal
noise standards for a variety of products including "transportation equip-
ment. 52 This will involve the setting of noise emission standards on "new
products" operated in or transported in interstate commerce. The Act also
provides specifically for the establishment of "noise emission standards
setting such limits on noise emissions resulting from operation of motor
carriers engaged in interstate commerce."5 3 (emphasis supplied) It is
also of importance that Federal noise emission standards will be set for
"construction equipment"5 4 since some of the more objectionable noise situ-
ations arise from the implementation stage of highway development as well
as the operational-traffic stage. At the minimum, it can be concluded that
a reasonably comprehensive statutory framework has now been created for
noise control over the entire highway/vehicular configuration. This stat-
utory scheme covers all of the principal stages of highway development:
assessment, planning, implementation, and operation. It is to be noted
that the Federal noise standards will apply only to "new products" and hence
to the manufacturing stage (with the exception of railroad and interstate
motor carrier operations) and that control over environmental noise from
various sources is otherwise left to the states or the political subdivisions
thereof "through the licensing, regulation, or restriction of the use,
51
See Congressional Record - Senate of October 18, 1972, p. S 18638 re
the Noise Control Act of 1972. Public Law 92-574 of October 28, 1972.
5 2 1d. at Sec. 6 (a) (1).
53d. at Sec. 18.
54
Id. at Sec. 6 (a) (1).
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operation, or movement of any product or combination of products."
5 5
It is evident that a coordinated approach is required to cope with
highway/vehicular noise problems including 1) reduction of noise at the
source (vehicular noise); 2) controlling the use of land in the vicinity of
highways; and 3) controlling the potential noise level through assessment,
56
planning and design of highway projects.
55
Id. at Sec. 6 (e) (1).
5 6See Noise Control Report, October 16, 1972, p. 125. Talk by
R. R. Bartelsmeyer, acting Federal Highway Administrator.
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT NOISE PROBLEM
Despite certain disclaimers by the Congress that Federal govern-
mental action has not completely preempted State and local regulation
of aircraft noise, it is generally acknowledged that the unique charac-
teristics of air traffic require Federal action for effective control.
Hence, this discussion will focus on Federal control of aircraft noise
with comments, as appropriate, on State and local noise abatement regu-
latory efforts. While there have been several successful private suits
brought on the theory of a "partial taking" (or inverse condemnation),
commencing with United States v. Causby in 1946,.5 7 it is evident as
noted by the court in the 1969 New Jersey case of Township of Hanover v.
The Town of Morristown (wherein plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Town of
Morristown from enlarging its airport for reason of anticipated increased
noise from an expanded airport operation) that "private compensatory
damage suits do not accomplish the end objective of noise suppression." 5 8
The 1970 Department of Commerce Report on The Noise Around Us asserts
that pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requiring each particular
model or make of aircraft to obtain an "airworthiness certificate" and an
"air operating certificate" that:
It is clear that the FAA has, . . . full power
to prescribe air traffic rules for the "protection
of persons and property on the ground," including
prescription of air traffic rules in the interest
of noise abatement. 5 9
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
58261 A.2d 692, 707 (1969).
5 9The Noise Around Us 146 (1970).
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While there may have been some doubts about this authority as of 1958,
Michael Wollan, in his article on "Controlling the Potential Hazards of
Government-Sponsored Technology" indicates that even though noise per se
was not mentioned in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, it was generally
assumed as of 1961 if not earlier, that the FAA had the authority to pre-
scribe aircraft noise standards. Wollan comments:
A year later (1961) when Congress made its first
appropriation for research on SST feasibility,
the FAA discussed more specifically the standards
it would use to regulate the SST's engine noise.
FAA's new administrator, Najeeb Halaby, told Congress:
"We would try to see to it that the noise levels
were tolerable to the community or as tolerable as
the then existing aircraft."60
It was with the passage of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966
that statutory authority was first specifically granted relevant to air-
craft noise, but no explicit provision was made for regulation. Section
4(a) of the Act directs the Secretary of DOT to "promote and undertake
research and development relating to transportation, including noise
abatement, with particular attention to aircraft noise."
All major participants in the national air traffic system have recog-
nized the existing and evolving dimensions of the aircraft noise problem
since shortly after World War II, although the more serious implications
might not have become clear until the introduction of jet-powered fleets
in the late 1950's. Report No. 1463 of May 23, 1968, of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce states:
6036 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1105, 1120 (1968). But see Conclusion 12 of
Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel of the Office of Science and
Technology, Executive Office of the President, on Alleviation of Jet
Aircraft Noise Near Airports of March, 1966, at 6.
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The right to use the airspace over the United
States in the operation of aircraft has long been
established. Aviation has become an essential
and widely approved part of our national trans-
portation system. However, aircraft noise and
sonic boom are unwanted and unpleasant. At this
stage of engine and aircraft development there
are no easy nor ready solutions to the continu-
ing and increasing problems.
A subcommittee of this committee first held
hearings on aircraft noise in September 1959 at
the New York International Airport. The House
of Representatives adopted House Resolution 420
in August of 1961 which specifically authorized
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
to investigate the problem, and in February of
1963 the committee published the "Investigation
and Study of Aircraft Noise Problems" (88th Cong.,
Ist Sess., H. Rept. No. 36).
Over the last ten years we have had numerous
panels of experts, with representatives from
virtually all segments of the aviation industry,
as well as from local governments and the Federal
Government. Airport operators, manufacturers,
air carriers and their associations, local port
authorities, municipal groups, NASA, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and the Department of Trans-
portation have all made contributions looking
toward solutions, particularly of the noise prob-
lem, but also many of them have been giving in-
creasing attention to the sonic boom problem.
The noise problem is basically a conflict between
two groups or interests. On the one hand, there
is a group who provides various air transportation
services. On the other hand there is a group who
live, work, and go to schools and churches in com-
munities near airports. The latter group is fre-
quently burdened to the point where they can neither
enjoy nor reasonably use their land because of noise
resulting from aircraft operations. Many of them
derive no direct benefit from the aircraft opera-
tions which create the unwanted noise. Therefore,
it is easy to understand why they complain, and
complain most vehemently. The possible solutions
to this demanding and vexing problem which appear
35
to offer the most promise are (1) new or modi-
fied engine and airframe designs, (2) special
flight operating techniques and procedures, and
(3) planning for land use in areas adjacent to
airports so that such land use will be most com-
patible with aircraft operations.61
Congressional hearings in 1962 "confirmed a 1960 House Committee
recommendation that 'noise criteria' be mandatory requirements in drafting
specifications for future . . . aircraft," since the lack of "maximum noise"
criteria established by the Federal government appeared to have been a
"deterrent to manufacturers to achieve greater noise suppression." It
is obvious that competitive considerations restrained the aircraft engine
manufacturers from allocating substantial research resources to aircraft
noise abatement. Rather the objective was to "build engines and aircraft
(with) maximum performance characteristics without regard to noise."
6 2 How-
ever, there were R&D efforts at the Federal level during the 1960's to cope
with the aircraft noise abatement problem, as for example, the NASA "Quiet
Engine" project.6 3 Nevertheless, despite the preemption by the Federal
government over aircraft flight operations pursuant to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 and what might plausibly appear to be a corresponding responsi-
bility for the full consequences of such operations, including noise suppres-
sion, the Federal government, overall, moved slowly. This would seem to have
6 1Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
of May 23, 1968, Report No. 1463, at 3-4.
6 2See EPA Report, supra note 27, at 2-78 through 2-80.
6 3See Report No. 1463 on Aircraft Noise Abatement to accompany H.R. 3400,
committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union,
May 23, 1968, at 18-19. See NASA Release of August 27, 1971, No. 71-
156 re "First Quiet Engine Noise Tests."
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been an inevitable consequence of the 1962 Supreme Court case of Griggs v.
Allegheny County6 4 which held the airport operator liable for damages, in-
cluding noise caused to a homeowner by aircraft operations and, therefore,
completely absolved the airline operators and the Federal government from
any responsibility whatsoever.
The authority of the Griggs decision had the effect of obstructing
the coordinated efforts required of all involved participants called for
by the OST Jet Aircraft Noise Panel in 1966 to abate aircraft noise.6 5
Further, Congress gave some thought to the possibility of the Federal
government's indemnifying all airport operators throughout the U.S. against
judgments obtained against them for noise damage alleged under the Griggs
doctrine but found this to be "impracticable."6 6 Hence, it was not until
64369 U.S. 84 (1962).
65See Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel of the Office of Science
and Technology, Executive Office of the President, on Alleviation of
Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports of March 1966, Conclusion 17, at 7.
6 6See EPA Report, supra note 27, at 2-81 and 2-82.
With respect to governmental compensation for noise abused citizens
it is of interest to note the following AP news item from the
Washington Post of Nov. 12, 1972, p. F 3, col. 7:
LONDON (AP)--The British government plans to ease the
plight of citizens whose lives are affected by advancing
transport technology. Legislation outlined this week
will provide compensation for people who suffer when
new highways and airports are built near their homes.
The only persons compensated when a new highway or air-
port is built now are those whose homes are actually de-
molished to make way for the development. The legisla-
tion, to be put before Parliament soon, recognizes that
those who have to live next to the noise and dirt that
transport hauls in its wake are entitled to protection.
Insulation against noise will be provided free for liv-
ing rooms and bedrooms when traffic noise rises above
stipulated levels. Money will be paid those forced to
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the passage of @611 in 196867 relating to the abatement of aircraft noise
and sonic boom and the subsequent promulgation by the FAA of noise standard
regulations on December 1, 1969, pursuant thereto, that the aircraft engine
manufacturers and the airlines had a compelling incentive to introduce
noise reduction criteria into their planning and operations.
FAA Type Certification of commercial aircraft delivered after December 1,
1969, under Part 36 of the FAA Aircraft Regulations, is perhaps the most
significant Federal action to date for control of aircraft noise. The DC-10
and Cessna Citation 500 have been certificated, and the L-1011 and all
subsequent subsonic aircraft will have to comply with Part 36; the
Boeing 747 was allowed until December 1, 1971, for compliance. These
planes are significantly quieter than older planes, but effectiveness
of Type Certification at a given point in time will depend on the make-up
of the fleet at that time. Projections by the Air Transport Association
estimate that by 1975 only 18.6% of the fleet will have been certified
under Part 36. Thus, to the extent that it depends upon type certifica-
tion as presently structured, the noise problem will have been only
leave their homes, over and above the compulsatory pur-
chase price now paid. Houseowners will be given up to
1,500 pounds--about $3,675--if they are deprived of
homes where they have lived for seven years or more.
They will have a statutory right to be rehoused at an
equivalent standard. Local authorities will be urged
to sell municipal houses to the dispossessed on bene-
ficial terms. The compensation plan is expected to
cost about $150 million a year.
67
An amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See EPA Report
supra note 27, at 2-47 through 2-54 and 2-83, 2-84.
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slightly relieved by 1975 and could remain significant until 1990.68 A
recent study has seemed to reach approximately the same conclusion through
use of an NEF contour area measurement.6 9
Regulations with respect to retrofit, sonic boom, SST type certi-
fication, and STOL/VO TL type certification are still in the developmental
stages. 70 Of all potential regulations, retrofitting would most likely
bring about the most effective noise reduction in the short-term, while
type certification regulations will probably be most effective in the
long run. Of course, effectiveness will depend upon the maximum permis-
sible noise levels set. The abatement effects of modest noise reduction
requirements with respect to type certification could be more than offset
by an increase in air traffic in certain situations. 71
6 8See EPA Report supra note 27, at §3.1.1 and U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Report to the President and Congress on Noise
(December 31, 1971) at 4-36.
6 9See Aircraft Noise Analysis for the Existing Air Carrier System
(September 1, 1972), a Bolt, Beranek and Newman Report (No. 2218)
submitted to Aviation Advisory Commission. The Report states under
Conclusion A-3:
Allowing the air carrier fleet to grow by normal
retirement of older aircraft, with replacement and
growth supplied by currently certified aircraft,
when coupled with the use of the noise abatement
flight procedures specified above, will reduce the
average areas enclosed by NEF 30 and NEF 40 to ap-
proximately 80% of 1972 values by 1976, remaining
essentially constant to 1980 (the noise reduction
due to newer aircraft being offset by increased
size of fleet), and dropping to approximately 60%
by 1985. (See Figure II-1.) Beyond 1985, with no
other change, noise exposure will increase as more
aircraft go into service.
See EPA Report to the President and Congress on Noise (December 31,1971) at 4-6.
7 1Both NASA and the Department of Transportation now seem to be moving
energetically on the development of quieter aircraft engines. See
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As a result of the pervasive Federal regulation of air transportation
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, State and local jurisdictions
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have been effectively precluded from control over aircraft noise. Local
ordinances undertaking to control noise, as, for example, by prohibiting
flights over the city at less than 1,000 feet, have been struck down for
note on NASA's effort to have a quiet engine for STOL aircraft devel-
oped. Science News, Vol 102, July 8, 1972, p. 26, and NASA Release
72-166 with respect to jetliners. See also Noise Control Report of
July 10, 1972, page 59 which noted that the FAA had awarded four
contracts in the amount of $4 million to two corporations and one
university to study jet engine noise reduction. And in the September 4,
1972, Noise Control Report at page 93 it was announced that NASA had
awarded $5.6 million in contracts for initial designs for the modifi-
cation of the jet engines which are currently in use to power the
older, noisier jets. FAA on July 25, 1972 published at 37 Fed. Reg.
14814 a notice of proposed rule-making. The proposed rule would apply
the Part 36 noise standards for new types of aircraft to newly pro-
duced individual aircraft of older types not presently subject to
Part 36. The legal instrument FAA would use to insure compliance
with noise standards by the new aircraft would be the airworthiness
certificate. The rule is proposed to govern all aircraft which receive
their certificates after July 1, 1973, for larger aircraft and after July 1,
1974, for smaller aircraft. FAA is now receiving and considering
comments on the proposed rule and whether or not it will be adopted
is still in doubt.
See, however, Washington Star-News of November 23, 1972, p. 3, col. 2,
which states that "Virtually all funds that Congress appropriated for
three key research programs aimed at developing technology for quieter
jet airplanes have been impounded by the Nixon administration." This
action by OMB, in effect, reduced the NASA budget by $44.9 million and,
according to the report, placed "a cloud over the entire noise abatement
program."
72A recent case on preemption is that of Lockheed Air Terminal v. City
of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 (1972) (CCA 9th Cir.) wherein the owner and
operator of the airport brought suit against the city and certain of
its officers seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring the invalidity
of a city ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking off between
the hours of 11:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. The Federal circuit court af-
firmed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
which held for the plaintiff airport owner and operator, stating that
the pervasiveness of federal regulation in the field of air commerce,
the intensity of the national interest in that regulation, and the
nature of air commerce itself, compelled the conclusion that state
and local regulation in that area has been preempted.
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being in conflict with FAA regulations or for imposing an unreasonable bur-
den on interstate commerce, or both. 73 On the other hand, it is quite clear
that the Federal government has not accepted a level of responsibility for
aircraft noise abatement (in terms of timely R&D and regulatory measures
to reduce noise at the source) which corresponds to the magnitude of con-
trol it exercises over air transportation. Yet, the Griggs doctrine places
liability for aircraft noise on the airport owner-operator which is, in
most situations, a State or local governmental entity. Furthermore, the
threat of massive damage awards is definitely increasing since the air-
craft noise situation is worsening in many areas. 74 While it may be
generally agreed that air transportation must be regulated at the na-
tional level, the lack of a corresponding national effort to abate one
7 3See EPA Report, supra note 27, at §2.3.1 and §2.4.1(C).
74See EPA Report, supra note 27, at §2.4.1 (F). See New York Times of
July 23, 1972, p. 24, col. 3 re "California Jetports Facing Dual
Problems With Noise." The story notes that in the last decade the
City has had docketed against it in connection with aircraft noise
from the Los Angeles International Airport more than $4 billion in
law suits. Further, as a result of the California Supreme Court
holding in Nestle v. Santa Monica, L.A. 29940, Super. Ct. No.
C-915322, April 28, 1972, (4 ERC 1080) the City became subject to
greatly extended liability for "nuisance" caused by the noise
created by jet aircraft using the Santa Monica airport. While the
California Supreme Court held that testimony of Santa Monica's ex-
pert witnesses that noise created by jet aircraft using the airport
would not cause hearing loss and that property values had not been
adversely affected would support the trial court's holding that there
was no action against the city on the theory of inverse condemnation,
the Court further held that neither the general rule of governmental
immunity under the California Government Code nor the Tort Claims
Act's exception of nuisance barred an action by residents claiming
that vibration, fumes and noise emanating from the Santa Monica air-
port created an actionable nuisance pursuant to Section 3479 of the
California Civil Code. Noise Control Report of August 7, 1972,
p. 76 states:
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of its most distressing side-effects encourages resort to the courts as
the only means of prodding, indirectly, a sluggish Federal system into
action. 7 5
Since the states and municipalities as airport owners-operators must
bear the direct and immediate burden of complaints from the noise-abused
public, they have seized upon whatever interstitial measures are avail-
able (governmental, technical, economic, etc.) to lessen the impact of
community complaints and noise damage judgments. Notable in this con-
nection is the doctrine of proprietary control over airport operations
which has its source in the concept of private ownership and operational
status as distinguished from operation of the airport by a State or local
governmental entity in its governmental capacity.7 6 While the Port of
New York Authority has been able to maintain noise standards set by it-
self (less stringent, however, than FAA standards for new aircraft) and
Out-of-court settlements totaling nearly $1.8 million
have been accepted by 34 families involved in Superior
Court civil suit complaining that noise of jets taking
off from Los Angeles International Airport's north run-
way was "indecent and offensive to the senses." Re-
maining 64 families are requesting $20,000 damages for
each home, $5,000 damages for each homeowner and $100,000
for each apartment building. Defendants in the civil
complaint are the city, 21 airlines who use airport,
and jet plane manufacturers. Class action suit charges
"noise, vibration and fumes" of jets using north runway
have damaged homes and caused personal pain and emotional
disturbances to residents. City is charged with failure
to properly plan for the runway by not purchasing property
adjacent to the airport. Property values reportedly have
declined due to noise and damage to homes. Remedies pro-
posed include closing runway during evening hours, and
restricting takeoffs.
7 5See EPA Report, supra note 27, at 2-104 and 2-105.
7 6Id. at §2.4.1(E).
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the new California regulations on noise standards for airports are essen-
tially grounded on the "power of airport proprietors," this regulatory
technique has severe limitations. This is particularly true for short-
term relief since most major airports are now situated in densely popu-
lated areas and proprietary control over noise reduction at the source is
essentially non-existent. The FAA has clearly preempted aircraft operations
as to safety. As to noise, the airport operator is left with whatever
marginal control he can exercise through such a measure as "planning runway
utilization schedules to take into account adjacent residential areas,
noise characteristics of aircraft and noise sensitive time periods" which
is provided, among other methods, in the California noise regulations for
airports. 7 7 While the proprietary doctrine may provide the airport opera-
tor some small but useful bargaining leverage vis-a-vis the Federal govern-
ment in the present evolutionary phase of aircraft noise regulation, it is
based on an uneasy legal assumption, namely, that an instrumentality of the
state, acting in a private, non-governmental capacity, has a degree of con-
trol over the activities prescribed in its State-originated charter which
the state itself is precluded from exercising.
Federal legislation since the enactment of §611 in 1968 provides some
support for aircraft noise abatement. Noise is an environmental impact and
should be considered in §102(2)(C) environmental impact statements for air-
port development and modification. There are no Federal noise standards for
airports. The Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 declares it to be
"national policy that airport development projects authorized pursuant to
this part shall provide for the protection and enhancement of the natural
7 71d. at 2-102 and 2-103.
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resources and the quality of the environment of the nation."
78 This Act
also provides for public hearings on airport projects, if requested.
An evaluation of the Federal role in aircraft noise abatement planning
must be approached with some caution and many qualifications. Approximate
total social impact assessments have been initiated at the Federal level as
studies; for example, Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel of the Office
of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, on Alleviation
of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports of March 1966, and the Joint DOT/NASA
Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study of March 1971. However,
these studies were not intended for and have not led to the development of a
national plan for aircraft noise abatement. Perhaps more illustrative of the
comprehensive planning approach are the Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement
Policy Studies (MANAPS) of HUD/DOT initiated in 1969 which are now being de-
veloped into a Planning Guidelines Manual for use by metropolitan communities
in the modification of existing airports or the location of new airports. 79
7849 U.S.C. S 1716 (c)(1) (Supp. 1971).
79See Aircraft Noise Impact (Planning Guidelines for Local Agencies)
prepared by Wilsey & Ham (WH 979-1) of July 1972. This Report
considers:
The Planning Context
Defining the Noise Problem
Options for Reducing Noise Conflicts
Developing a Noise Abatement Program
The Future of Noise Abatement Policy
One of the more thorough studies of airport location including con-
sideration of the noise factor was that of the proposed new London
Airport. See paper presented at the NATO Advanced Institute on
Technology Assessment, Milan, Italy, September 18-29, 1972, entitled
The Third London Airport: a Case Study by Frank P. Thompson, Civil
Aviation Authority, London. See also in this connection Samuel Eilon,
"Goals and Constraints in Decision-Making," 23 Operational Research
Quarterly 3 (March 1972).
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The central thrust of this effort is to provide alternative strategies for
achieving land use development compatible with airports.
There are, of course, plausible reasons which can be advanced to rebut
the implied suggestion above that the Federal government, in view of its pre-
emption of control over aircraft operations, might reasonably be expected to
assume a commensurate responsibility for aircraft noise abatement. For
example, the problem might be handled in several ways, including: abate-
ment at the source (reducing engine noise); reduction of the effects of
noise as by buffers, insulation, or compatible land use management; and
provision for compensation for those harmed by aircraft noise. The Federal
government has restricted its efforts primarily to noise reduction at the
source as reflected in the enactment of §611. It has rejected the assump-
tion of liability for aircraft noise as it was privileged to do pursuant
to the Griggs case. It has not intervened in the land use management
function, this being a traditional prerogative of State and local juris-
dictions under the "police power."80
The upshot of the situation described is that municipalities, whose
citizens are directly and adversely affected by the noise, must suffer the
social costs without benefit of regulatory authority. This being the ex-
isting condition, states and cities have grasped whatever legal and non-
legal devices are available to protect themselves from liability as well
as to reduce the complaints of noise-abused citizens. This is why the
proprietary doctrine has been asserted and to some extent applied by the
80 See EPA Report, supra note 27, at S 2.4.1 (A).
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Port of New York Authority. And the Preamble of the Noise Regulations for
California Airports states, somewhat unconvincingly it might be added, that:
These standards are based upon two separate legal
grounds: (1) the power of airport proprietors to
impose noise ceilings and other limitations on the
use of the airport, and (2) the power of the state
to act to an extent not prohibited by federal law.
The fact of the matter is that such control seems marginal at best.
However, in the wake of Nestle v. Santa Monica California airports appear
intent on trying.8 1 Further, noise abatement programs involving comprehen-
sive land use schemes are either so costly or so long-term or so politcally-
charged that such alternatives offer little short-term surcease. 8 2 States
8 1See note 74 supra describing the "nuisance" liability potential for
noise intrusion. See also New York Times, July 23, 1972, p. 24, col. 3,
which recites that Los Angeles International Airport will be imposing
as of December 1, 1972, "the most stringent operating restrictions on
jetliner flights in the nation for noise abatement."
The possibilities under consideration. . . include
requiring certain flights to make their landing
approaches to the airport over the Pacific surf-
line west of the airport rather than over residen-
tial communities; requiring some flights to make
steeper descents during their approaches to the
airport; reducing the number of people exposed to
the noise, and reducing operations between 10 P.M.
and 7 A.M.
The FAA has established a new standard of "Get-'Em-Higher Earlier"
departure procedure designed to reduce jet aircraft noise over airport
communities. See Release 72-158 of August 8, 1972.
8 2But see New York Times, July 23, 1972, p. 24, col. 3 which states that:
The city of Los Angeles is spending more than
$200 million to buy and raze more than 2,000
homes, schools and shops near the airport and
has experimentally soundproofed many homes and
schools to make the whine and roar of jets less
annoying.
That there are serious conflicts among the major participants in the
aircraft noise decisional context was again manifested in the rejec-
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or localities would seem to have some appreciable degree of control over
aircraft noise effects only with respect to new airport developments. 8 3
The Minnesota Airport Zoning Act 84 is a notable illustration of this type
of State/local initiative, providing for appropriate regional governmental
entities, eminent domain powers, land use and development controls, and
intergovernmental tax sharing arrangements which may assure minimum noise
intrusion if a major new airport is contructed in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area.
It seems a reasonable conclusion that both piecemeal and tardy action
by the Federal government with respect to aircraft noise avoidance and
abatement assures the continuance of this troublesome environmental in-
trusion for some years to come. However, provisions of the new Federal
Noise Control Act of 1972 may encourage a strong EPA input into FAA air-
craft noise regulatory procedures which may, in time, produce accelerated
amelioration of this problem. Section 7 (a) provides:
tion by the Airport Operators Council International of proposed FAA
standards for measuring airport noise. According to the Washington
Evening Star of October 12, 1971, p. A-7, col. 1, "Airport managers
around the nation complained sharply about the original proposal,
arguing that it might force them to purchase tens of thousands of
homes near airports at a cost of several billion dollars." The dis-
pute centered in part over the use of the "noise exposure forecast"
measure of noise effects; the airport operators feel that the use of
this measure might be invoked in legal proceedings to their damage.
8 3The new Kansas City Jetport was located 17 miles from the center of
the city so as to facilitate mobility and to avoid noise intrusions
on large numbers of residents. See New York Times, Oct. 22, 1972,
p. 30, col. 1. It is also proposed that the jetport proprietor will
control large land areas adjacent to the airport so as to monitor
development and avoid future protests of citizens should new resi-
dential sections be permitted within 10 miles of the airport.
84 See Chapter 1111, 1969 Session Laws, Minnesota.
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Aircraft Noise Standards
Section 7. (a) The Administrator (of EPA) after
consultation with appropriate Federal, State, and
local agencies and interested persons, shall con-
duct a study of the (1) adequacy of Federal Avia-
tion Administration flight and operational noise
controls; (2) adequacy of noise emission standards
on new and existing aircraft, together with
recommendations on the retrofitting and phase-
out of existing aircraft; (3) implications of
identifying and achieving levels of cumulative
noise exposure around airports; and (4) addi-
tional measures available to airport operators
and local governments to control aircraft
noise. He shall report on such study to the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
of the House of Representatives and the Commit-
tees on Commerce and Public Works of the Senate
within nine months after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.
And Section 7 (b) which amends S 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
recites such amended section in part:
"(c.)(l) Not earlier than the date of submission
of the report required by section 7 (a) of the
Noise Control Act of 1972, EPA shall submit to
the FAA proposed regulations to provide such
control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom (including control and abatement through the
exercise of any of the FAA's regulatory authority
over air commerce or transportation or over air-
craft or airport operations) as EPA determines is
necessary to protect the public health and welfare.
The FAA shall consider such proposed regulations
submitted by EPA under this paragraph and shall,
within thirty days of the date of its submission
to the FAA, publish the proposed regulations in
a notice of proposed rulemaking. Within sixty
days after such publication, the FAA shall com-
mence a hearing at which interested persons shall
be afforded an opportunity for oral (as well as
written) presentations of data, views, and argu-
ments..."
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V. THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT-PLANNING TASK: EVALUATING THE
SOCIAL BENEFIT OF NOISE ABATEMENT
The two preceding sections have touched briefly on the extent to which
the noise factor has been considered in the planning of transportation
systems as reflected by actions of various legislative and regulatory
entities at the Federal, regional, state and local levels. Such actions
represent primarily the prescribing phase of the public decision process
rather than the preceding assessment/planning phase. Surely, if the pro-
gram planning phase, supported by an anticipatory project assessment com-
ponent, has any vital relevance to the effective public decision process,
it should influence the prescribing phase either at the legislative or
regulatory level or both. Hence, one of the critical questions relates
to the extent to which the available hard, "demonstrable data" (concerning
such factors as technological feasibility, economic costs, degree of safety
provided, social behavioral patterns, etc.) associated with and offered in
support of recommended noise emission standards actually support such standards
to the satisfaction of the responsible legislative or regulatory body. Noise
standards reflect, in part, a normative or social value judgment by the pre-
scribing entity, presumably determined to be in the public interest. There-
fore, the task of evaluating the social impact of identified noise effects
in particular contexts or in similar patterns of noise intrusion contexts
cannot be escaped. Put otherwise, how much is it worth to reduce the noise
level by so many decibels within a given period of time? This question has
many variations depending upon the specific decisional context. It is sub-
mitted that this is the crucial question for the adjudicating or prescribing
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entity; it is also the crucial question for transportation systems plan-
ners if the latter expect to influence the standards prescribing entity.85
This paper has not attempted to address the question of means by which
the social impact of noise effects can be evaluated. It has attempted
merely to describe some of the more significant statutory schemes which
require that noise effects be taken into account in transportation project
planning and to note certain judicial decisions as well as state and local
actions (both governmental and proprietary) which undertake to cope with
the consequences of existing and prospective operational effects of air-
craft noise. Evaluation of the social impact of noise effects in con-
nection with anticipatory project assessments of transportation proposals
presents a complex and difficult analytical task. The OST RECAT Report
stated in this connection:
1. Despite the evident desirability of abatement
of vehicular noise, at this time neither the costs
nor the benefits associated with various levels of
noise reduction have been quantified. As a conse-
quence the relationship between benefit and cost as
a function of noise emission is not established, and
rational determination of ultimate noise-reduction
goals is not possible. If noise-control regulations
are not to produce arbitrary and costly constraints
on motor vehicle design, studies that will provide a
basis for regulation must be carried out to determine
85In this connection the discussion of the need to directly relate
overall planning to local conditions by George C. Hemmens in Urban
Development Modeling (1970), at pages 28-32 is instructive. In
this paper Professor Hemmens states: "In short, there was a chasm
between the planning process and the decision process." (p. 28)
(Monograph No. 6 of the Program of Policy Studies in Science and
Technology, The George Washington University.)
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the economic costs and the benefits associated
with attaining various levels of noise emission.86
8 6Cumulative Regulatory Effects on the Cost of Automotive Transportation
(RECAT), Office of Science and Technology, February 28, 1972, at 85.
Also see EPA Report, supra note 27, at §2.4.2(E). See also Mayo, "Some
Prospective Implications of Federal Noise Emission Standards on State/
Local Noise Regulation," in Selected Papers from the Washington Hearings
on Noise Abatement and Control, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
November 9-12, 1971. One of the critical difficulties with even system-
atic efforts to abate or regulate environmental noise is the lack of
an agreed upon "community noise measure." See Request for Proposal No.
DOT-OS-20103 of March 6, 1972, which states in part:
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of investigators have worked
toward the development of an adequate method of describing
"community noise." These studies have lead to measures
such as CNEL, CNR, NEF, TNI, NPL and countless others. The
number of measures available is symptomatic of the problem
that exists; the lack of a single one which is applicable
to any study of noise in a community.
The abundance of "special purpose" measures of community
noise follows from the same approach which has lead to the
large number of methods of characterizing aircraft noise.
(See the attached bibliography for a partial listing of
studies and reports.) In most instances of both aircraft
and community studies a measure resulted from a sequence
resembling the following:
1. A particular noise source is identified as a major
cause of disturbance. (Aircraft, automobile traffic.)
2. Methods are developed to describe in quantitative
terms the physical characteristics of the sounds.
3. Subjective evaluations are based on surveys, lab-
oratory research, available literature and/or ex-
pert judgments.
4. In community noise studies, noise contour maps are
drawn indicating areas impacted by the major noise
source being investigated taking into account varia-
bles such as the characteristics of the noise source,
the total number of events, reaction of people to
these or "similar" noises. The variety of such maps
reflect the interests of particular investigators
and the problems they address.
These efforts appear to be directed more and more toward
quantification and a progressive sophistication of methods of
describing the noise within a given physical boundary. However,
the primary purpose for developing community noise measures has
been obscured.
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However, as emphasized above, this task must be confronted if the estab-
lishment of noise emission standards and the selection of appropriate noise
abatement programs are to be approached on a deliberate, rational basis.
While the RECAT judgment on the infeasibility of evaluating the social im-
pact of noise effects may have been justified within the context of that
particular study, it does not accurately reflect the analytical situation
in all noise abatement decisional contexts.87 Further, it is to be noted
that S 102(2)(B) of NEPA directs that agencies develop methods, procedures
and techniques
.which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given ap-
propriate consideration in decision-making along with
economic and technical considerations.
86 (Cont)
HOW DO THESE NOISES AFFECT THE PEOPLE PERFORMING
THEIR NORMAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY?
If this is the real question to be answered, then the focus
of attention becomes the person rather than an area or a par-
ticular single type of source, and noise contours should be
drawn primarily to indicate and quantify the noise exposures
that a person encounters throughout the day (week, year) and
how these noises are experienced - interrupted conversations,
loss of sleep, etc. Of critical importance is to make measures
where noise is experienced, whether indoors or outdoors, at
home or at work, while travelling or during recreational acti-
vities. Since measures are to be applicable generally, there
shouldn't be any pre-suppositions about major noise sources
or particular community sizes to be sampled. Non-urban as
well as inner city areas should be included in any sampling
program.
8 7See, for example, Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
333 F. Supp. 338 (1971), wherein it was held that there was compen-
sable "taking" by the city of New Haven, the owner and operator of
the airport, but not by the airlines, of a permanent easement with
respect to homes over which the aircraft passed or very nearly passed
several times a day at an altitude of less than 500 feet, but that
there was no "taking" of other properties which were subject only to
occasional overflights or to noise, soot, and fumes.
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The social impact evaluation of environmental noise effects or in the
alternative, the social impact (benefit) of noise abatement programs
would seem to be a prime candidate for such attention. 8 8 Aspects of
this analytical/evaluative task have been treated elsewhere by the author
in a recent paper.89
The importance of the task of social impact evaluation of noise
effects justifies a few additional comments for emphasis. Another way
of posing the task of evaluating the social impact of noise effects is
to ask: how can available scientific, technological, economic, and social
behavioral data and analyses be applied by the assessment/planning entities
so as confidently to establish the parameters within which realistic noise
reduction goals, regulations, and standards can be prescribed? Acknowledg-
ing that heated disputes often arise over the validity of even so-called
"scientific" data, there would seem to be, nevertheless, a considerable
reservoir of consensus data and analyses concerning what is practicable
with respect to noise abatement within given periods of time, the economic
costs of alternative abatement strategies, and what the socio-political
8 8Numerous efforts have, of course, been made to develop evaluative
techniques for measuring social impact of noise and to actually per-
form social cost/benefit assessments of particular proposals. Re-
cent instances involving such analytical/evaluative efforts include
the FAA's consideration of the "retrofit" of pre Part 36 types of jet
aircraft, Noise Control Report, August 7, 1972, p. 72; a DOT study to
analyze relative costs and benefits of alternative methods of re-
ducing commercial aircraft noise, Noise Control Report, October 16,
1972, p. 126; and the Third London Airport study mentioned in Note 79,
supra.
8 9See Mayo, Social Impact Evaluation (Program of Policy Studies in
Science & Technology of The George Washington University, Occasional
Paper No. 14 of November, 1972).
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effects will be. Therefore, the question may be asked: how far have we
moved toward the application of available data and analyses in the setting
of noise standards, thereby eliminating a corresponding degree of needless
and obfuscating partisan contentiousness? Hopefully, we are making some
progress. This is not said to denigrate adversarial system. Judgments
pertaining to the social impacts of various noise effects and the manner
in which the costs and benefits of noise abatement programs are to be shared
are matters which properly fall within the ambit of adversarial process.90
Judgments on such matters as these involve alternative concepts of social
justice (Scheme of Social Values and Relative Weights), and the applica-
tion of such concepts in specific assessment/decisional contexts constitute
appropriate subjects for competing views in the public decision process.91
One further point of considerable importance needs to be made. While
at some point in time the responsible prescribing entity must accept an
anticipatory assessment outcome (however arrived at) and a planning strategy
for implementation based thereon, this should not be the end of the matter.
After all, the objective is to achieve prescribed environmental noise re-
duction. But in order to determine if the actual noise levels of target
sources or environments are in fact being reduced, all Federal, State and
local noise abatement programs must be monitored and evaluated on a continu-
ing basis so that modifications, as necessary, can be introduced into these
programs periodically. Effective noise abatement involves a continuing
evaluative function - not simply a "one shot" decision.
90Mayo, Scientific Method, Adversarial System, and Technology Assessment
(The George Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in
Science and Technology) Mon. No. 5, November 1970.
91
See Note 89, supra.
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